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WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
J. Rodney Johnson * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2009 Session of the General Assembly enacted wills, 
trusts, and estates legislation (1) preventing, in cases where per-
sons die aft.er June 30, 2009, application of a regrettable 2008 
Supreme Court of Virginia decision dealing with the rights of ille-
gitimate heirs in intestate succession, and (2) amending Virgin-
ia's version of the Uniform Principal and Income Act to provide 
for taxpayer benefit and clarity in matters relating to total return 
unitrusts, the marital deduction, and the income taxation of 
trusts. In addition, there were several other enactments along 
with four opinions from the Supreme Court of Virginia during the 
one-year period ending June 1, 2009 that presented issues of in-
terest in this area. This article reports on all of these legislative 
and judicial developments, and it concludes with a call to the 
2010 General Assembly to repeal the one-year statute of limita-
tions applicable to paternity claims of illegitimate persons in suc-
cession matters. 1 
II. LEGISLATION 
A. Illegitimacy-Succession-Statute of Limitations-Paternity 
Only 
As a consequence of the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Trimble v. Gordon,2 Virginia law was amended in 1978 by 
* Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Richmond School of Law. 
1. In order to facilitate the discussion of numerous Virginia Code sections, they will 
often be referred to in the text by their section numbers only. Unless otherwise stated, 
those sections will refer to the most recent version of the section to which reference is be-
ing made. 
2. 430 U.S. 762, 766 (1977) (holding that "statutory discrimination against illegimi-
tate children is unconstitutional"). 
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adding section 64.1-5.1 to permit an illegitimate child to inherit 
from and through his father3-a right already existing on the ma-
ternal side.4 However, this legislation did not result in a complete 
equality of taking because, while continuing the rule that "a per-
son born out of wedlock is a child of the mother," it provided that 
"[t]hat person is also a child of the father, if ... [t]he paternity is 
established by clear and convincing evidence as set forth in 
§ 64.1-5.2."5 Although the 1978 legislation was prompted by an in-
testate succession concern, its application was intended to be sig-
nificantly broader, as was shown by its opening language, which 
provided for its rules to apply throughout the entirety of title 
64.1, entitled Wills and Decedents' Estates. 6 The scope of section 
64.1-5.1 was further expanded in 1998 to provide for its rules to 
apply as follows: "If, for purposes of [Title 64.1] or for determining 
rights in and to property pursuant to any deed, will, trust or other 
instrument, a relationship of parent and child must be estab-
lished to determine succession or a taking by, through or from a 
person .... "7 
Section 64.1-5.1, as originally enacted in 1978, also contained a 
one-year limitation period within which claims by, or on behalf of, 
illegitimate children must be filed. 8 Up to the 2009 amendment, 
this provision continued to read as follows: 
4. No claim of succession based upon the relationship between a child born 
out of wedlock and a parent9 of such child shall be recognized in the settle-
3. Act of Apr. 8, 1978, ch. 647, 1978 Va. Acts 1047, 1048-49 (codified at VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 64.1-5.1 (Cum. Supp. 1978)). 
4. The background of this development is discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Inherit-
ance Rights of Children in Virginia, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 275, 281-84 (1978). 
5. Act of Apr. 8, 1978, ch. 647, 1978 Va. Acts. 1047, 1048 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 64.1-5.1(2)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978)). This same enactment also added section 64.1-5.2 to 
the Virginia Code, which limited the admissible evidence of paternity to six enumerated 
categories. Id. at 1049 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-5.2 (Cum. Supp. 1978)). As a re-
sult of amendments made in 1989, 1991, and 1999, all limitations on admissible evidence 
of paternity have been eliminated. See VA. CODE ANN.§§ 64.l-5.1(3)(b), 64.1-5.2 (Rep!. Vol. 
2007 & Supp. 2008). 
6. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-5.1 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (The statute provided, "[i]f, for pur-
poses of Title 64.1, a relationship of parent and child must be established to determine 
succession by, through or from a person: ... ,"and then set forth specific rules for estab-
lishing paternity.) 
7. Act of Apr. 15, 1998, ch. 603, 1998 Va. Acts 1409, 1409 (codified as amended at VA. 
CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1 (Cum. Supp. 1998)). The 1998 legislation is discussed in J. Rodney 
Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 
1405, 1408-09 (1998). 
8. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-5.1(3) (Cum. Supp. 1978). 
9. Although the use of the words "parent" and "parenthood" in this subsection sug-
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ment of any decedent's estate unless an affidavit by such child or by someone 
acting for such child alleging such parenthood has been filed within one year 
of the date of the death of such parent in the clerk's office of the circuit court 
of the jurisdiction wherein the property affected by such claim is located and 
an action seeking adjudication of parenthood is filed in an appropriate circuit 
court within said time. 10 
633 
In Jenkins u. Johnson, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that 
the italicized language in the foregoing block quote-"'in the set-
tlement of any decedent's estate"'-unambiguously showed a leg-
islative intent to confine the one-year limitation period of section 
64.1-5.1(4) to cases involving intestate succession to personal 
property.11 Therefore, the court held that plaintiffs, who brought 
an action in 2006 seeking to share in the real estate left upon 
their alleged illegitimate father's death intestate fourteen years 
earlier, were not subject thereto. 12 
In order to minimize the restrictive impact of this decision, the 
Virginia Bar Association ("VBA") sponsored legislation in the 
2009 Session that resulted in striking the language in question-
"in the settlement of any decedent's estate"-from section 
64.1-5.1(4), thereby clearly making the one-year rule applicable to 
all succession claims based upon an illegitimate birth. 13 However, 
the rule of the Jenkins case will continue to control in any cases 
gests at first glance that its one-year statute of limitations is equally applicable to claims 
of maternity and paternity, the reality is quite different. There are three exceptions to the 
one-year rule, one of which applies "where the relationship between the child born out of 
wedlock and the parent in question is (i) established by a birth record prepared upon in-
formation given by or at the request of such parent .... " VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1(4) 
(Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008). Assuming the correctness of the anecdotal evidence that 
birth information is almost always taken from the mother, then, notwithstanding the 
usage of "parent" in this subsection, its one-year statute of limitations is really a rule that 
is applicable only in paternity cases. Such was the intent of the proponents of the one-year 
rule, who wanted it to apply only to paternity claims because of their fear in 1978 that the 
new rule allowing illegitimate children to take on the paternal side might result in a num-
ber of spurious paternity claims being brought after rebutting evidence was no longer 
available. However, they feared that a statute of limitations applicable only to paternity 
cases would be vulnerable to the same equal protection argument that prevailed in Trim-
ble. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 766, 769, 772 (1977). Hence, the legislative le-
gerdemain that makes the provision facially applicable to maternity and paternity effec-
tively excludes its applicability to maternity cases by the "birth record" exception. For the 
record, this writer was in the committee room back in 1978 when the one-year rule was 
added to the bill under consideration and he clearly remembers it and its "birth record" 
exception being added for this express purpose. 
10. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-5.1(4) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008) (emphasis added). 
11. 276 Va. at 30, 35, 661 S.E.2d 484, 486 (2008) (quoting VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-5.1(4) 
(Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008)). This case is discussed infra Part III.A. 
12. Id. at 32, 35, 661 S.E.2d at 484, 486. 
13. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 449, 2009 Va. Acts_ (codified at VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-
5.1(4) (Cum. Supp. 2009)). 
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that though brought after June 30, 2009, are based upon a death 
that occurred between July 1, 1978 (the date that the one-year 
rule was added to the Virginia Code) and July 1, 2009 (the effec-
tive date of its repeal). Most importantly, it should be noted that 
the legacy cases from this thirty-one-year period will not be li-
mited to those raising the narrow holding in Jenkins-real estate 
passing by intestate succession. 14 Instead, they will also include 
every case where any property, real or personal, is passing out-
side of the estate administration process. The most significant of 
these cases will be real property devised by wills and both real 
and personal property passing via inter vivos trusts, which are 
increasingly being used as will substitutes. However, the poten-
tial negative impact of Jenkins in these cases will be reduced to 
some extent by (1) the probability that most persons having such 
a claim are unlikely to ever hear about the Jenkins rule and (2) 
the application of the doctrine of adverse possession in cases 
where the period has expired before any action is brought by ille-
gitimate persons claiming to be successors. 
B. Fiduciary Accounting-Principal and Income Act 
The 2009 General Assembly enacted House Bill 2435 to make 
significant technical changes to three sections of Virginia's Uni-
form Principal and Income Act (''VUPIA"). 15 
1. Total Return Unitrusts 
Following the release of final regulations by the Department of 
the Treasury in 2003, which ended certain tax uncertainties con-
14. Note also that some of these real estate cases might end up being subject to the 
one-year rule because of actions taken during an estate's administration. Pursuant to a 
request made under section 64.1-57.1, an administrator of a decedent's intestate estate 
may be granted the boilerplate fiduciary powers contained in section 64.1-57, one of which 
is the power to sell real estate. See VA. CODE ANN.§§ 64.1-57, 64.1-57.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & 
Cum. Supp. 2009). In cases where this power is granted, and exercised, it will bring the 
proceeds from such a sale into "the settlement of [the] decedent's estate." To the extent 
that any of these proceeds remain following the settlement of the decedent's estate, will 
they be treated as personal property or, under the doctrine of equitable conversion, will 
they be treated as real estate? How this question will be answered, and how it may impact 
upon the rights of any illegitimate heirs, where the death occurred in the 1978-2009 pe-
riod under consideration, vis-a-vis their need to comply with the one-year rule, is yet to be 
determined by the court. 
15. H.B. 2435, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2009) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2009, 
ch. 477, 2009 Va. Acts_). 
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cerning their usage, the 2004 General Assembly amended the 
VUPIA to authorize the "total return unitrust" ("TRU"), 16 which 
bases income payments to a trust's present beneficiaries on a per-
centage of the trust portfolio's fair market value. 11 The 2009 Gen-
eral Assembly significantly amended this legislation in two ways. 
First, its application, which was previously restricted to the con-
version of existing income trusts into TRU s, was extended to 
"grantor-created" TRUs. 18 Second, it authorized all qualified bene-
ficiaries, except for the attorney general, to go into "circuit court 
to convert an income trust to a total return unitrust, convert a to-
tal return unitrust to an income trust, or change the percentage 
used to calculate the unitrust amount or the method used to de-
termine the fair market value of the trust assets."19 Under prior 
law, these rights could only be exercised by trustees.20 
2. The Marital Deduction 
One of the most popular ways of obtaining the federal estate 
tax marital deduction is by creating a qualified terminable inter-
est property ("Q-Tip") trust for the surviving spouse under § 
2056(b)(7) of the Internal Revenue Code, which requires, among 
other things, that the spouse be "entitled to all the income from 
the property, payable annually or at more frequent inter-
vals .... "21 In 2006, the Internal Revenue Service, focusing on 
cases involving qualified defined benefit plans and individual re-
tirement accounts ("Funds") that were held by Q-Tip trusts, is-
sued Revenue Ruling 2006-26, in which it considered the circums-
tances under which the spouse's interest in these Funds would 
16. Act of Apr. 12, 2004, ch. 639, 2004 Va. Acts 927, 927-29 (codified at VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 55-277.4:1 (Cum. Supp. 2004)). 
17. The background and details of these developments are discussed in J. Rodney 
Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 
447, 447-50 (2004). 
18. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 477, 2009 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-277.4:1(G) (Cum. Supp. 2009)). Section 55-277.4:1(A)(3) provides that a 
"'[g]rantor-created unitrust' means a trust, created either by an inter vivos or a testamen-
tary instrument, which provides that the trust shall be administered in the manner of a 
total return unitrust as provided in this section." Id. (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-277.4:1(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2009)). 
19. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 477, 2009 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 55-277.4:1(0) (Cum. Supp. 2009)). 
20. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 55-277.4:1(0) (Repl. Vol. 2007). 
21. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii)(I) (2006). 
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meet the income requirements of§ 2056(b)(7).22 Revenue Ruling 
2006-26 also contains a safe harbor provision, which guarantees 
that Funds will meet these income requirements if two elements 
are satisfied. "First, the Fund's income must be determined as if 
the Fund itself were a marital trust. Second, the surviving spouse 
must have the right to receive this income without regard to the 
income of any trust to which the Fund is payable."23 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States 
Laws, acting at its summer 2008 annual meeting, amended sec-
tion 409 of the Uniform Principal and Income Act ("UPIA")24 so 
that actions taken thereunder in enacting jurisdictions would 
meet the safe harbor requirements of Revenue Ruling 2006-26.25 
The 2009 Session amended section 55-277.18 to make correspond-
ing changes to the Virginia version of UPIA section 409, mutatis 
mutandis, in order to satisfy the safe harbor requirements of 
Revenue Ruling 2006-26.26 
3. Income Taxes 
Lastly, this 2009 legislation made an amendment to section 
55-277 .29 that "clarifies how a trust that is required to pay in-
come to a beneficiary keeps enough money to pay its taxes and 
distribute the balance of the income to the mandatory income be-
neficiary ."21 
22. Rev. Rul. 2006-26, 2006-1 C.B. 939, 939. Although the cases in this revenue ruling 
arose in the context of IRAs under § 2056(b)(7), the ruling also deals with marital-
deduction trusts under § 2056(b)(5) in the context of all funds payable to either. Id. at 
940-41. 
23. Steven B. Gorin, Principal and Income Act Amendment Saves the Marital Deduc-
tion for Retirement Plans, PROB. & PROP., Mar./Apr. 2009, at 13. 
24. The Summer 2008 amendments to UPIA section 409 can be found incorporated 
into the text of the entire Act at http://www.law.upenn.edu/b1Varchives/uk/upaia/2008_fin 
al.htm (last visited on Oct. 11, 2009). 
25. Gorin, supra note 23, at 13-14. 
26. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 477, 2009 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 55-277.18 (Cum. Supp. 2009)). 
27. Summary as Passed House, HB 2435: Uniform Principal and Income Act; Trustee 
Required to Demand Certain Distributions If Requested, http://legl.state.va.us/cgi·binlleg 
p504.exe?ses=091&typ=bil&val=HB2435 (last visited Oct. 11, 2009). 
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C. Nonresident Decedents-Virginia Personal Property-
Simplified Transfer-Problem 
637 
The 2009 Session amended section 64.1-130, which provides 
several methods by which tangible or intangible Virginia personal 
property of a deceased foreign domiciliary may be paid directly to 
the decedent's domiciliary personal representative without the 
necessity for any probate of the property in Virginia. 28 According 
to the General Assembly's Legislative Information Services Divi-
sion, the 2009 amendment 
[c]larifies that a transferor of a nonresident decedent's stocks, bonds, 
securities, money or tangible personal property held in Virginia may 
comply with either the law of Virginia or the comparable law of the 
state in which the nonresident decedent was domiciled regarding the 
transfer of the decedent's property held in Virginia. 29 
However, the 2009 amendment itself, which was made into the 
final, one-sentence paragraph of section 64.1-130 that provides a 
constructional rule for the section, causes that sentence to read as 
follows: 
This section shall be construed as providing, as to the payment of 
money and the delivery of personal property belonging to nonresi-
dent decedents or their estates, optional methods of procedure in ad-
dition to those otherwise permitted or provided by law, including a 
comparable law of the state in which the nonresident decedents were 
domiciled, and shall not as to such matters add any limitations or 
restrictions to existing law.30 
According to this author's reading of section 64.1-130 prior to the 
2009 amendment, the first paragraph created remedies and the 
one-sentence second paragraph in question merely said that these 
remedies were options to other (Virginia) procedures, and the sec-
tion's enactment did not have any negative impact upon these 
other procedures. His reading of the amendment is "ditto as to 
the laws of other states," insofar as the remedies of the first para-
graph are concerned. In other words, neither the options provided 
in section 64.1-130, nor the comparable options provided by a de-
28. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 250, 2009 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 64.1-130 (Cum. Supp. 2009)). 
29. Summary as Passed, SB 806: Nonresident Decedents' Personal Property in State; 
Transferor Thereof May Comply with Law of State, http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504 
exe?ses=091&typ=bil&val=SB806 (last visited Oct. 11, 2009). 
30. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 250, 2009 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN.§ 64.1-130 (Cum. Supp. 2009)). 
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cedent's domiciliary state, have any negative impact on other 
Virginia procedures for transferring the personal property of a 
nonresident decedent. Thus, although the intent of the 2009 
amendment is clearly shown by its title and by its official sum-
mary as passed31-i.e., to authorize Virginians to also make the 
transfers covered by this section pursuant to the laws of a fo-
reigner's domiciliary state-it is believed that the actual lan-
guage of the amendment to the construction paragraph does not 
accomplish this goal. And this might not be a bad result when one 
considers the complexity and uncertainty that would accompany 
an obligor's determination of a non-resident's domiciliary state 
and the potential employment of the laws of any American state 
in what are typically low-asset cases. Thus, instead of repairing 
this amendment in the 2010 General Assembly, it is respectfully 
submitted that it would be better to repeal it. 
D. Federal Estate Tax-Open-Space Easement Exclusion32 
Section 2031 of the Internal Revenue Code excludes from taxa-
tion any land subject to a qualified conservation easement when 
the estate's executor makes the necessary election.33 While this 
election poses no problem where the estate's beneficiaries are 
competent, consenting adults, the inability of other beneficiaries 
to consent to such an election by the executor (or by the trustee 
where the property is a trust) proved to be troublesome. The ne-
cessity of this election presents no problem where all of the es-
tate's beneficiaries are competent, consenting adults. However, 
the inability of other beneficiaries to consent to such an election 
by the executor (or by the trustee where the property is a trust) 
proved to be troublesome. This problem was addressed by the 
1999 Session of the General Assembly, which created a new sec-
tion 64.1-57.3, authorizing the circuit court to give this consent 
"on behalf of any unborn, unascertained or incapacitated heirs, 
beneficiaries, or devisees whose interests are affected thereby."34 
31. See supra note 29. 
32. The General Assembly's 1999 amendments regarding conservation easement ex-
clusion are also discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, 
Trusts, and Estates, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1075, 1090 (1999). 
33. I.RC. § 2031(c) (2006). 
34. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-57.3 (Cum. Supp. 1999). 
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For the same reasons that led to the 1999 legislation, the 2009 
Session amended section 64.1-57.3 to also apply to "an open-space 
easement as provided in the Open-Space Land Act(§ 10.1-1700 et 
seq.)."35 
III. CASES 
A. Illegitimacy-Action to Establish Succession-No Time 
Limitations on Heirs 
In Jenkins u. Johnson, Joseph died intestate in 1992, survived 
by his wife, Madelyn, and their four children. 36 In 2006, Sharon 
and Joann, who claimed to be Joseph's illegitimate children born 
prior to his marriage to Madelyn, brought an action seeking to es-
tablish their rights as co-heirs with Madelyn and her four child-
ren in certain real estate Joseph owned at his death.37 Madelyn 
and her children defended in part on the ground that one of the 
steps required by statute before an illegitimate person's claim to 
intestate succession based upon biological parentage can be rec-
ognized is that "an action seeking adjudication of parenthood is 
filed in an appropriate circuit court within" one year of the al-
leged parent's death.38 The governing statute, section 64.1-5.1, 
provided in relevant part that: 
If, for purposes of this title or for determining rights in and to 
property pursuant to any deed, will, trust or other instrument, a re-
lationship of parent and child must be established to determine suc-
cession or a taking by, through or from a person: 
4. No claim of succession based upon the relationship between a 
child born out of wedlock and a parent39 of such child shall be recog-
nized in the settlement of any decedent's estate unless an affidavit by 
such child or by someone acting for such child alleging such parent-
hood has been filed within one year of the date of the death of such 
parent in the clerk's office of the circuit court of the jurisdiction 
35. Act of Mar. 27, 2009, ch. 588, 2009 Va. Acts_ (codified as amended at VA. CODE 
ANN. § 64.1-57.3 (Cum. Supp. 2009)); see also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1700-10.1-1705 
(Repl. Vol. 2006). 
36. Jenkins v. Johnson, 276 Va. 30, 32, 661 S.E.2d 484, 484 (2008). 
37. Id. 661 S.E.2d at 484-85. 
38. Id. at 33-34, 661 S.E.2d at 485-86 (quoting VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-5.1(4) (Repl. Vol. 
2007). 
39. See supra note 9 for an explanation of why "parent" and "parenthood" in this pro-
vision really mean "father" and "paternity" in the typical case. 
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wherein the property affected by such claim is located40 and an ac-
tion seeking adjudication of parenthood is filed in an appropriate cir-
cuit court within said time.41 
Holding that "the language of Code § 64.1-5(4) is plain and un-
ambiguous," and affirming the trial court decision, the Supreme 
Court of Virginia concluded that the one-year limitation period of 
the statute "appl[ies] only to 'the settlement of [a] decedent's es-
tate,' and do[es] not apply to the determination of heirs to, and 
the partition of, real property passing by intestate succession."42 
Thus, as Sharon and Joann had successfully established Jo-
seph's paternity,43 when Joseph's real estate descended to his 
heirs at the instant of his death intestate, it descended to them 
along with his other heirs without regard to the one-year limita-
tion period of section 64.1-5.1(4), even though their failure to 
comply with this one-year rule would bar them from sharing in 
Joseph's personal estate passing through probate44-a point con-
firmed by the court's 2007 decision in Belton v. Crudup. 45 To say 
that such a result appears to be inconsistent with any rational 
legislative purpose seems to be stating the rather obvious. How-
ever, the Supreme Court of Virginia never considered this point 
because, it said, under the "plain meaning" rule, "when the lan-
guage of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts may not in-
terpret that language in a manner effectively holding that the 
General Assembly did not mean what it actually stated."46 
But, was this statutory provision really "plain and unambi-
guous" in the first place? Note that the one-year provision in sec-
40. Such an affidavit was filed by Sharon in 2006, prior to the initiation of the circuit 
court action. Jenkins, 276 Va. at 32, 661 S.E.2d at 484. 
41. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-5.1 (Rep!. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008) (emphasis added). 
42. Jenkins, 276 Va. at 35, 661 S.E.2d at 486. 
43. See id. at 33 n.1, 661 S.E.2d at 485 n.1 ("This Court refused [Defendants'] assign-
ment of error that the commissioner and the circuit court erred in concluding that [Plain-
tiffs] had proven by clear and convincing evidence that Joseph was their biological father. 
Thus, we do not address that issue in this opinion.") 
44. Id. at 35, 661 S.E.2d at 486. 
45. 273 Va. 368, 373, 641 S.E.2d 74, 76 (2007) (discussed in J. Rodney Johnson, An-
nual Survey of Virginia Law: Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 435, 464 
(2008)). On this point, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated that "[u]nlike the proceedings 
in Belton, the present case does not involve the administration of an estate comprised of 
personal property, but addresses the determination of title to real property passing by in-
testate succession. Thus, our holding in Belton is inapposite to the conclusion we reach 
here ... . "Jenkins, 276 Va. at 36, 661 S.E.2d at 486. 
46. Jenkins, 276 Va. at 34-35, 661 S.E.2d at 486. 
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tion 64.1-5.1( 4) requires that the affidavit of paternity be filed "in 
the clerk's office of the circuit court of the jurisdiction wherein the 
property affected by such claim is located."47 This "is located" lan-
guage is what would typically be used to refer to real property, 
because only realty has a unique situs that cannot be changed. 
This alone would seem to create a genuine ambiguity on the issue 
of whether the one-year rule applies to personalty (settlement of 
the estate), to realty (where the property is located), or both. 
Moreover, the introductory language of section 64.1-5.1-"[i]f, for 
purposes of this title ... a relationship of parent and child must 
be established to determine succession or a taking by, through or 
from a person"48-is very broad and suggests that the section's 
rules are intended to apply across the board, that is, to intestate 
realty as well as to intestate personalty, or at least the point 
would be debatable and ambiguous. However, neither of these is-
sues was mentioned in the court's opinion. Believing this opinion 
to be wrong, and learning that counsel for Madelyn and her child-
ren intended to seek a rehearing, the VBA sought, and was 
granted, permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support the-
reof.49 However, the petition for a rehearing was denied,50 which 
led the VBA to lobby for, and obtain, legislation in the 2009 Ses-
sion of the General Assembly that reverses the court's holding for 
cases where decedents die after June 30, 2009.51 
47. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-5.1(4) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008) (emphasis added). 
48. Id.§ 64.1-5.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2008). 
49. Order Granting Motion Requesting Leave to File a Brief Amicus Curiae, Jenkins, 
276 Va. 30, 661 S.E.2d 484 (2008) (No. 071206). The VBA acted through its section on 
Wills, Trusts, and Estates, with Katherine E. Ramsey, Esquire, of Hunton and Williams 
LLP, Richmond, Virginia, serving as counsel. The writer is a member of the VBA's section 
on Wills, Trusts, and Estates and played an active role on the matter. 
50. Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, Jenkins, 276 Va. 30, 661 S.E.2d 484 (2008) 
(No. 071206). Unfortunately, the court does not state any reasons when it denies a rehear-
ing. One wonders what the responses might have been to the points made in Ms. Ramsey's 
brief concerning (1) the ambiguity of the phrase, "settlement of [a) decedent's estate," (2) 
the applicability of the introductory language of section 64.1-5.1 to the case at bar, (3) the 
public policy of the Commonwealth, and (4) the court's contrary decision in Hupp v. Hupp, 
239 Va. 494, 391 S.E.2d 329 (1990). See Brieffor Virginia Bar Association as Amicus Cu-
riae in Support of Appellants' Petition for Rehearing, Jenkins, 276 Va. 30, 661 S.E.2d 484 
(2008) (No. 071206). 
51. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
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B. Joint Accounts-Agency- Confidential Relationship-
Presumption of Undue lnfiuence 
In Parfitt v. Parfitt, the facts followed a reasonably well-
established pattern, that is, a terminally ill parent (Jane) adding 
the name of one of her sons (Jeff) to her bank account as a joint 
owner "to assist Jane in paying her bills."52 The joint bank ac-
count, which in another context was once referred to by the Su-
preme Court of Virginia as the "poor man's will,"53 can also be re-
ferred to, as shown in the present context, as the "poor man's 
power of attorney." In recognition of this latter use, the 1996 Ses-
sion of the General Assembly added section 6.1-125.15:1 to the 
Virginia Code to provide in part that "[p]arties to a joint account 
in a financial institution occupy the relation of principal and 
agent as to each other, with each standing as a principal in re-
gard to his ownership interest in the joint account and as agent in 
regard to the ownership interest of the other party."54 
In Parfitt, during the period between the joint account's crea-
tion in 2004 and Jane's death in 2006, Jeff liquidated and trans-
ferred "at least $338,580.12" of Jane's assets to the joint account. 55 
During this same period, although Jeff made no personal deposits 
to this joint account, from it he (1) transferred $305,591.00 to a 
joint account he shared with his wife, (2) wrote $67,500.00 in 
checks to himself, and (3) wrote $9,013.37 in checks to various 
payees for the benefit of himself and his wife. 56 When Jane's es-
tate brought an action against Jeff alleging, inter alia, breach of 
fiduciary duty, the trial court, following a three-day non-jury tri-
al, ruled that "(i) the Estate had failed to establish the existence 
of undue influence [and] (ii) the evidence had not established a 
confidential relationship between Jeff and Jane."57 
The Supreme Court of Virginia, recognizing the difficulty of 
producing direct proof in cases of alleged undue influence, noted 
longstanding precedent in two contractual situations for raising a 
52. 277 Va. 333, 337, 672 S.E.2d 827, 828 (2009). 
53. King v. Merryman, 196 Va. 844, 849, 86 S.E.2d 141, 143 (1955). 
54. Act of Mar. 19, 1996, ch. 260, 1996 Va. Acts 472, 472 (codified at VA. CODE ANN.§ 
6.1-125.15:1 (Cum. Supp. 1996)). 
55. Parfitt, 277 Va. at 338, 672 S.E.2d at 828. 
56. Id. at 338, 342, 672 S.E.2d at 828, 830. 
57. Id. at 338, 672 S.E.2d at 828. 
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presumption of undue influence58 which would shift the burden of 
going forward to the defense and serve as sufficient proof if not 
rebutted.59 Breaking new ground, the court then held that "[t]hese 
principles apply to gratuitous transfers as well as contracts."60 Ac-
cordingly, the court found that "[b]ecause Jeff did not contribute 
any funds to Jane's account, he was, by operation of statute [re-
ferring to section 6.1-125.15:1], an agent with regard to the entire 
account. By statute, a confidential relationship was estab-
lished ... ," and one of the instances in which a presumption of 
undue influence will arise is when one is in a confidential rela-
tionship profits as a result of self-dealing.61 Thus, as "[t]he confi-
dential relationship created a presumption that the self-dealing 
transactions were 'unduly obtained,"'62 the trial court's decision to 
the contrary was reversed and the case remanded for further pro-
ceedings. 63 
C. Wills-Probate-Appeal of Clerk's Order-Bill to Impeach 
In Matthews v. Matthews, Donald, Sr. died on October 3, 2005, 
survived by his wife Ingeborg and three children from a prior 
marriage-Allan, Donald, Jr., and Kathy.64 On February 1, 2006, 
after first attempting to probate a copy of Donald, Sr.'s 1995 will, 
which was refused by the clerk, Ingeborg returned to the clerk's 
office with the original of his 1993 will which the clerk admitted 
to probate.65 Kathy and Donald, Jr. brought an action to impeach 
the 1993 will on the theory that (1) it was revoked by the 1995 
will, (2) the 1995 will had been denied probate, and (3) therefore 
Donald, Sr. had died intestate.66 Thereafter, Ingeborg filed defen-
sive pleadings to the bill to impeach the 1993 will and also filed a 
separate appeal of the February 1, 2006 clerk's order refusing the 
1995 will's probate.67 Following a motion by the children to dis-
58. See Fishburne v. Ferguson's Heirs, 84 Va. 87, 111, 4 S.E. 575, 582 (1887). 
59. Id. at 339-40, 672 S.E.2d at 829 (quoting Bailey v. Turnbow, 273 Va. 262, 267, 639 
S.E.2d 241, 243 (2007)). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 340-42, 672 S.E.2d at 829-30. 
62. Id. at 342, 672 S.E.2d at 830 (quoting Fishburne v. Ferguson's Heirs, 84 Va. 87, 
113, 4 S.E. 575, 582 (1887)). 
63. Id. at 344, 672 S.E.2d at 831. 
64. 277 Va. 522, 525, 675 S.E.2d 157, 158 (2009). 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
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miss this appeal, which was denied by the court, the bill to im-
peach the 1993 will and the appeal of the 1995 will's denial of 
probate were consolidated for trial with the consent of the par-
ties.68 At the trial's end, the court granted a directed verdict hold-
ing that the 1993 writing was not Donald, Sr.'s last will, and the 
jury found in favor of the 1995 will.69 
On appeal, the children claimed that Ingeborg's probate of the 
1993 will precluded her from later appealing the denial of the 
1995 will's probate because it would be "an impermissible colla-
teral attack upon the validity of the 1993 will, result[ing] in [In-
geborg] approbating and reprobating because she assumed mu-
tually contradictory positions, and was barred by judicial 
estoppel."70 However, after discussing these claims in technical 
detail, and determining their non-applicability, the Supreme 
Court of Virginia concluded by noting that Ingeborg had not been 
successful with the probate of the 1993 will at the time she filed 
her appeal of the 1995 will's denial because of the children's chal-
lenge to the 1993 will, and, therefore, the court held that she 
"should not have been judicially estopped from appealing the 
clerk's order denying probate of the 1995 will."11 Accordingly, the 
trial court's judgment was affirmed and final judgment was en-
tered for Ingeborg.72 
D. Trustee's Duty to Sell-Evidence of Damages 
In SunTrust Bank v. Farrar, the primary question before the 
Supreme Court of Virginia, on unique facts, was 
whether the circuit court erred in entering a monetary judgement 
against the trustee and in favor of the beneficiaries of a trust for 
breach of fiduciary duty arising from the management of a coal min-
ing property [and failing to sell it in 1991 instead of 1997] when the 
only evidence of damages presented by the beneficiaries was based 
on an appraisal without evidence of a willing buyer at the appraised 
value. 73 
68. Id. at 525-26, 675 S.E.2d at 158. 
69. Id. at 526, 675 S.E.2d at 159. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 530, 675 S.E.2d at 161. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 549, 675 S.E.2d at 187-88. 
2009] WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 645 
Relying on well-established precedent, the court answered this 
question in the negative. 74 In addition, the court further held that 
the trial court's judgement against the Trustee for $89,028.30 in 
damages due to the Trustee's delay in not making a sale in 1991 
was erroneous because "there was insufficient evidence to show 
that any action or inaction by the Trustee resulted in a failure to 
sell the property prior to 1997 .... "75 Accordingly, the trial court 
was reversed on all counts, and final judgment was entered for 
the Trustee. 76 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The developments during the period covered by this article that 
will affect the most persons77 are (1) the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Virginia in Jenkins u. Johnson, holding that the one-year 
statute oflimitations in§ 64.1-5.1(4) did not apply to a decedent's 
illegitimate heirs,78 and (2) the 2009 Session's legislative response 
reversing the impact of that decision in cases where persons die 
after June 30, 2009. 79 It is respectfully submitted that the better 
legislative response would have been to completely repeal the 
one-year rule in order to end this discrimination against illegiti-
mate persons in all succession matters and allow them to take on 
the same basis as legitimate persons.80 In support of this view, the 
74. Id. at 554, 557, 675 S.E.2d at 190, 192 (citing Pizzarelle v. Dempsey, 259 Va. 521, 
527, 526 S.E.2d 260, 263 (2000); VA. CODE ANN.§ 8.01-680 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 
2008)). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. The two developments in question both related to illegitimate children. In 2007, 
the latest year for which statistics are available, Virginia recorded 108,417 live births, of 
which 38,281 (35.3%) were illegitimate. Virginia Department of Health, Table 2: Resident 
Total Live Births with Rates per 1,000 Females Ages 15-44 by Race and Non-Marital Live 
Births with Percents Non-Marital of Total Births by Planning District and City or County, 
Virginia, 2007, available at http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/healthstats/NonMaritalBirths07. 
pdf. 
78. See supra Part Ill.A. 
79. See supra Part II.A. 
80. The one-year provision, as amended in 2009, reads in its entirety as follows: 
No claim of succession based upon the relationship between a child born out 
of wedlock and a deceased parent of such child shall be recognized unless an 
affidavit by such child or by someone acting for such child alleging such pa-
renthood has been filed within one year of the date of the death of such par-
ent in the clerk's office of the circuit court of the jurisdiction wherein the 
property affected by such claim is located and an action seeking adjudication 
of parenthood is filed in an appropriate circuit court within said time. How-
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reader's attention is directed to the following arguments: (1) the 
statute is unfairly discriminatory because it applies only in cases 
where an illegitimate person is trying to establish paternity;81 (2) 
advances in scientific evidence since 1978 have eliminated the old 
concern about spurious claims of paternity; (3) the public's atti-
tude toward illegitimate persons has shifted significantly since 
the one-year rule was established in 1978; (4) anecdotal evidence 
from attorneys shows that the majority of persons do not discri-
minate against potential illegitimate family members when they 
write their wills; and (5) the mandate that "such one-year period 
shall run notwithstanding the minority of such [illegitimate] 
child,"82 when nothing requires the claim of a legitimate minor to 
be made within a year of a "parent's" death, is at least unfair and 
perhaps a denial of due process and equal protection. 83 To those 
who would argue that repealing the one-year rule would result in 
a flood of claims and unsettle titles to property, it should be noted 
that, (1) this does not respond to the justice of the proposal, and 
(2) with the exception of personal property passing by intestate 
succession, the Jenkin's decision has already eliminated the one-
year rule in all succession cases where the "parent" died between 
July 1, 1978, and July 1, 2009. Thus the floodgates for these thir-
ty-one years have already been opened. Accordingly, for the fore-
going reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the 2010 Session 
of the General Assembly should repeal section 64.1-5.1(4). 
ever, such one-year period shall run notwithstanding the minority of such 
child. The limitation period of the preceding sentence shall not apply in those 
cases where the relationship between the child born out of wedlock and the 
parent in question is (i) established by a birth record prepared upon informa-
tion given by or at the request of such parent; or (ii) by admission by such 
parent of parenthood before any court or in writing under oath; or (iii) by a 
previously concluded proceeding to determine parentage pursuant to the pro-
visions of former§ 20-61.1 or Chapter 3.1 (§ 20-49.1 et seq.) of Title 20. 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-5.1(4) (Cum. Supp. 2009). 
81. See supra note 9. 
82. VA. CODE ANN.§ 64.1-5.1(4) (Cum. Supp. 2009). 
83. Id. § 8.0l-229(A)(l) (Rep!. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2009) (with exceptions not re-
levant to the present case, providing in part that "[i)f a person entitled to bring any action 
is at the time the cause of action accrues an infant ... such person may bring it within the 
prescribed limitation period after such disability is removed .... "). 
